Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2005

State of Utah v. Sharon Kaye Reddish : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Scott L Wiggins; Arnold and Wiggins, P.C..
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Utah Attorney General;
Brandon L. Poll; Deputy Davis County Attorney; Counsel for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Reddish, No. 20050403 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/5779

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20050403-CA

vs.
SHARON KAYE REDDISH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (WEST 2004), POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (WEST 2004), POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37A-5(l) (WEST 2004), AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (WEST 2004), IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF
UTAH. DAVIS COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN, PRESIDING

SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Counsel for Appellant

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
-th
160 East 300 South, 611 Floor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
BRANDON L. POLL
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Counsel for Appellee

NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
ci! r n

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
CaseNo.20050403-CA

vs.
SHARON KAYE REDDISH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AN APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (WEST 2004), POSSESSION OR USE OF A
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (WEST 2004), POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE
ANN. § 58-37A-5(l) (WEST 2004), AND DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, IN VIOLATION OF
UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-44 (WEST 2004), IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF
UTAH, DAVIS COUNTY, THE HONORABLE DARWIN C. HANSEN, PRESIDING

SCOTT L. WIGGINS
Arnold & Wiggins, P.C.
American Plaza II, Suite 105
57 West 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Counsel for Appellant

KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470)
Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666)
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL
-<h
160 East 300 South, 6VFloor
PO BOX 140854
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854
Telephone: (801) 366-0180
BRANDON L. POLL
Deputy Davis County Attorney
Counsel for Appellee

NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

}

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

.

.

Page
i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

2

STATUTES AND RULES

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

.3

STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

.....10

ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT HARMED BY THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
OF HER CONVICTION FOR DRUG POSSESSION WHEN THE FACTS
UNDERLYING THE CONVICTION HAD ALREADY BEEN ADMITTED, AND
THE STATE HAD PRESENTED OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF HER
GUILT.
A. Admission of underlying facts of 1998 conviction

12

B. Evidence of defendant's conviction, when the facts of the underlying crime
had already been introduced, was harmless

13

II. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO RESOLVE AN ALLEGED INACCURACY IN THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT

15

III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS
PREJUDICED BY HIS COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ASK THE COURT
TO RESOLVE THE ALLEGED INACCURACY IN THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT

16

i

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

<

CONCLUSION

..:.................;.............

NO ADDENDUM NECESSARY

.....27
<

ii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516 (Utah),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994)
Statev.Allen,2005\JT\\,108P.3d730

..17
.

State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 993 P.2d 837

..13
13

State v. Gambling, 2000 UT 44, 1 P.3d 1108

17

State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992)

2, 14

State v. Housekeeper, 2002U1 U%, 62V 3d AAA

....14

State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, 973 P.2d404

15

State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, 94 P.3d 295

15, 17

State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996)

13

State v. Smith,2005 UT57,122P.3d615

2

State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998)

17

State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, 6 P.3d 1133

2, 15

State v. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185, 4 P.3d 100
State v. JFn£/tf,2004UTAppl02,90P.3d644...

14
16

STATE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (West 2004)

1

Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8 (West 2004)

1,3

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004)

1

iii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004)

3, 15

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 2004)

...1

STATERULES
UtahR. Evid. 210

.........7

Utah R. Evid. 212

...................;......:.................„.....

UtahR. Evid. 404..

7
3

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

iv

'

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
VS.

Case No. 20050403-CA

-

SHARON KAYE REDDISH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* is ik

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from convictions for possession or use of a controlled substance, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004),
possession or use of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West 2004), possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004), and driving under
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 41-6-44 (West 2004), in the Second District Judicial Court, Davis County, the Honorable
Darwin C. Hansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (West 2004).
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ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error when it admitted evidence of
defendant's prior drug conviction, when evidence of her drug use and arrest leading to
that conviction had been previously admitted without objection?
A reviewing court need not review a challenge to the admission of evidence under
rule 404 (b)3 Utah Rules of Evidence, where any error could only be harmless. See State v.
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992) (finding "unnecessary" to review merits of rule
404 (b) claim where there was "no substantial likelihood that the outcome would have been
different absent admission of this evidence").
2. Did the trial court comply with its statutory obligation to resolve an alleged
inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report
"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty is a question of law that
we review for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, If 13, 6 P.3d 1133.
3. Whether counsel appointed to defendant solely for sentencing was ineffective
by informing the court of an alleged inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report,
but not expressly requesting the court to resolve the inaccuracy on the record?
"An ineffective assistance of counsel claim presents a question of law that is []
reviewed for correctness." State v. Smith, 2005 UT 57, ^[ 6, 122 P.3d 615 (citing State v.
CtorJt,2004*UT25,t6,89P.3dl62).

2
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STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b)
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake or accident....
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West2004)
. . . Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which
have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing,
shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may
grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the
report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot
be resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant

was

charged

with

possession

of

a

controlled

substance

(methamphetamine), a second degree felony, possession of a controlled substance
(marijuana), a class A misdemeanor, possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, and driving under the influence of drugs, a class B misdemeanor. Rl-3, 8687. Defendant filed a motion to suppress the drugs and paraphernalia, which the trial court
denied. R50-58, 82-84. l

1

Charges for third-degree felony possession of methamphetamine (count I) and class
B misdemeanor possession of marijuana (count II) were enhanced one degree based on
defendant's prior conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Rl-3, 86-87. See
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a)(i), -(b)(ii), -(c), -(d) (West 2004).

3
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On January 26, 2005, a jury found defendant guilty of all charges. R121-23. The
court sentenced defendant to one to fifteen years in prison for her felony conviction, but
suspended that commitment and instead sentenced her to 180 days in jail. R162. The court
also sentenced defendant to serve 365 days for her marijuana possession and 180 days each
for possession of drug paraphernalia and driving under the influence (DUI). Rl 62-63.
However, the court suspended all but the first 180 days of her commitment. R163. The
court placed defendant on probation for three years, directing her release to an inpatient drug
rehabilitation program after serving ninety days in jail if space became available. R163;
207:58. Defendant timely appealed. R167-68.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant is stopped andfound with drugs.
On the night of May 20, 2004, Officer Cory Galbraith was patrolling in Clearfield.
R209:77-78. As he crossed Main Street, he noticed that a car driven by defendant lacked a
front license plate, and he initiated a traffic stop. R209:78. Making a U-turn, he pulled
behind the car and activated his overhead lights. Id. Rather than pulling immediately to the
right, defendant proceeded for another block and then stopped in the turn lane. R209:79-80,
210:208. She then made a left hand turn into a parking lot, made two right turns, and pulled
into a parking stall. R209:79-81. This piqued Officer Galbraith's suspicions, because
"Wypically most people pull to the right... [I]t was kind of odd." R209:80,117. Trooper
Lisa Steed, who had been following Officer Galbraith, described the driver's actions as "a
little weird," and she also pulled into the parking lot to "keep the scene safe." R209:172.

4
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Officer Galbraith exited his patrol car and asked defendant for her license and
registration. R209:81-82. Officer Galbraith grew suspicious that defendant was intoxicated
as she "bumbled" through her papers, searching for her registration. R209:82, 124. He
noted that "she was grinding her teeth, she had an involuntary eye twitch, . . . she was
shaking her head more in a tremor type of way, she was fumbling with her fingers a lot,
couldn't hold her hands still." R209:82, 126. He also noted that she "had an abnormal
difficulty thumbing through the papers." Id. He testified that although everyone is nervous
when he initiates traffic stops, they generally do not exhibit such symptoms. Id. Although
defendant maintained that she was not missing her front license plate, Officer Galbraith
visually confirmed that it was missing. R210:248. He testified that he made no attempt to
restrain defendant from viewing the front of the car. Id.
Defendant's behavior having sufficiently aroused his suspicions, Officer Galbraith
ordered her out of the car to perform sobriety tests. R209:85. He first conducted a
horizontal gaze nystagmus test and noted a "lack of smooth pursuit in both eyes," indicating
defendant had recently used drugs. R209:85-87. He also conducted a convergence test,
which is specific to drug identification, and found a lack of convergence in defendant's left
eye. R209:87-88. He then conducted part of a Romberg test, in which the suspect is asked
to tilt back her head with her eyes closed, a test designed specifically to detect the use of
methamphetamine. R209:88-89,139. Defendant's eyes twitched very rapidly, "faster than
an individual could actually blink their eyes." R209:89. Finally, Officer Galbraith took
defendant's pulse, and found it to be 122 beats per minute. Id. This was within the normal
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range of someone high on methamphetamine. R209:90-91. While defendant was out of the
vehicle, she continued to grind her teeth, clench her jaw, and "fumble with her fingers."
R209:92,138,173. In addition, "her speech was very rapid. She didn't complete sentences,
her sentences were real choppy.... [S]he would change the details of what she was saying."
R209:92,173. Based on the test results, Officer Galbraith placed defendant under arrest for
driving while intoxicated. R209:92.
Incident to the arrest, Officer Galbraith searched the passenger compartment of
defendant's car. R209:95. In the back seat, he found a blue vinyl zipped bag, which
contained small baggies of methamphetamine and marijuana, a glass pipe coated with white
crystals, digital scales covered with white residue, three prescription pills, and seventeen
dollars. R209:95-96,101-03. After receiving her Miranda rights, defendant agreed to speak
with the officer. R209:93, 104. Initially, she denied knowledge of the bag, and stated that
she had not used methamphetamine in six years. R209:104-05. She later changed the
number of years to seven, and again to five. R209:105. She then indicated that the drugs
were not hers. R209:106. However, when asked if her fingerprints would be found on any
of those items, she said that they would, but that "the money and her fingerprints on any of
those items would be from the last time she used methamphetamine[,] [w]hich she indicated
was seven years ago." R209:106,161. Also, defendant knew the precise amount of money
in the bag, and when asked how she knew it, she again "said it would have beenfromthe last
time she used meth which was . . . seven years ago." R209:161. Officer Galbraith then
asked defendant for a blood sample, which she refused. R209:107-09.

6
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Admission of prior drug conviction.
At trial, defense counsel elicited from Officer Galbraith that defendant "argued with
[him] at that time that she believed [he] had done a background check on her and that [he]
was familiar that she had been arrested on a prior occasion for drugs and that she believed
that's why [he] was asking her to get out of the vehicle." R209:133. Later, while testifying
herself, the prosecutor asked the defendant whether she had told the officer that she "had a
prior conviction for meth? Seven years -", to which she responded, "No I did not. I never
did. No. It's nothing to brag about." R210:210. After her response, defense counsel
objected to the question, and the court considered the objection outside the jury's presence.
id.

';•-..
Specifically, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's reference "to her prior

criminal conviction" as "an improper reference to a prior bad act." R210:211. He feared
that the jury, after hearing of her conviction, would "say, 'Once a user, always a user,' and
[might] improperly convict her based upon conduct that occurred six years ago. . . as
opposed to conduct which [occurred] on [] May 20th, 2004." Id. The prosecutor opposed
the objection, arguing that because defendant had denied any knowledge of the drugs, intent
was a key issue to the case, thus bringing the conviction under an expressly recognized
exception under Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence R210:212. Furthermore, the
prosecutor noted that defense counsel had already brought up defendant's drug use with
Officer Galbraith on cross examination, and that "the door [was] open." R210:212. Defense
counsel responded that although evidence of her prior use had already come in, no one had

7
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previously made reference to the actual conviction. R210:213. Defense counsel conceded
"that there is an exception we acknowledge and recognize that being an exception."
R210:214. However, he asked the Court to find that the prejudicial effect of the evidence
outweighed its probative value. Id.
The court began by noting that it was required to consider three elements when facing
a 404(b) objection. Id. First, "whether or not the particular prior bad act, conviction or not,
falls within one of the exceptions." Id. The court found that intent was a very real issue in
the case, and "given the context in which the issue arises," the Court found that the exception
applied. Id. Second, the court found that the exception was relevant to the case "because it
would help the finder of fact to determine whether or not the alleged drugs or the drugs that
were found in the vehicle were drugs there for the purpose of use and was intended to be
used by the defendant. Therefore, it is certainly relevant." R:210:214-15. Third, the court
weighed its probative value against any unfair prejudicial effect. R210:215. It found that the
"evidence that deals with [defendant's] intent, which in the Court's view, is significantly
important." Id. The court concluded that although the evidence could be considered
prejudicial, it was not "unfair for that evidence to come in." R210:216. The court then
informed counsel that the jury would be informed that the evidence could only be used for
the purposes of intent, and not for any other purpose. Id. After the jury was instructed, the
prosecutor asked defendant if she had "in fact, used meth six or seven years ago."
R210:217-18. Defendant confessed that she had. Id. He then asked whether she was
convicted for that use, which she also admitted. Id.

8
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Defendant testified that she did not grind her teeth (R210:189); that she had not used
methamphetamine on the night of May 21,2004 (R210:200); and that Officer Galbraith had
told her that, as a felon, she did not have rights (R210:195); and that the officer had not
performed most of the sobriety tests he described. R210:192-94. She denied telling Officer
Galbraith that her fingerprints would be on the contents of the bag and testified that she was
never asked for a blood sample. R210:199, 203. She also testified that it had been "over
four" years since her last use of methamphetamine. R:210:223. In her defense, defendant
called a friend, Vicky Long, to the stand. Long testified that the bag belonged to her, and
that she had accidentally placed it in the car. R210:233-34. She had come forward to take
responsibility only the day before trial. R210:227. Defendant was her best friend.
R210:239. Long had no prior drug offenses and was aware that defendant did have prior
drug convictions. R210:240.
The jury found defendant guilty on all counts. R210:297-98. Defendant then
stipulated to her 1998 convictions for enhancement purposes, and the court referred
defendant to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for a presentence investigation report
(PSI). R210:302-03.
Sentencing
At sentencing, the court asked if there were any corrections to the PSI. R207:34.
Defendant replied that the conviction dated November 26,1983 never took place, but that the
rest of the PSI was accurate. R207:34-35. The court then asked for argument from defense
counsel, the defendant, and the prosecutor. R207:35. Defense counsel did not address the

9
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discrepancy during his argument. R207:35. Defendant did not make a statement at
sentencing, but had a friend speak for her. R207:35-37. After her friend had spoken, but
before the prosecutor could address the court, the judge was handed a motion to disqualify,
filed by defendant. R207:39. The Court took a recess for two weeks while the motion was
considered. Id. The presiding judge of the district court denied the motion. R149-50. When
sentencing reconvened, defendant did not mention the discrepancy again. R207:42-55. In
accord with AP&P's recommendation, the prosecutor asked that defendant serve 180 days in
jail, followed by release to an inpatient facility for drug rehabilitation. R207:56. The court
followed the recommendation, directing that defendant be released for rehabilitation after
only ninety days of incarceration, if space in a program became available. R207:57.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. The trial court's brief, but precise rejection of defendant's rule 404(b) objection to
the admission of her prior seven-year-old drug conviction shows that the evidence was
properly admitted. It is unnecessary, however, to analyze the court's ruling in detail since
any error was so clearly harmless. Evidence of the drug use and arrest underlying the
conviction had already been admitted without objection.

In addition, there was

overwhelming evidence of guilt: defendant failed several sobriety tests, refused a chemical
test, and was found in sole possession of the drugs and paraphernalia at the time of her
intoxication. The fact that her previous drug use and arrest had led to a conviction would not
have surprised the jury and would have done little to prejudice them against her.

10
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II. The state concedes that the trial court committed error by failing to address and
resolve defendant's objection to a 1983 drug conviction listed in the presentence report.
However, the remedy to this error is not reversal, but a remand for the sole purpose of
resolving the alleged inaccuracy.
III. It is unnecessary to consider whether counsel rendered deficient performance by
not insisting that the trial court immediately resolve the alleged inaccuracy in the PSI
because defendant has failed to establish prejudice. Defendant's claim of prejudice is
inadequately briefed—a single sentence, without citation to the record or supporting
analysis. Also, even if the alleged error in the presentence investigation report were resolved
in defendant's favor, the trial court would still have sentenced defendant as it did. The court,
in accord with AP&P's recommendation, leniently sentenced to defendant, a drug abuser,
without apparent regard to the number of her prior drug convictions.
ARGUMENT
I. DEFENDANT WAS NOT HARMED BY THE ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE OF
HER CONVICTION FOR DRUG POSSESSION WHEN THE FACTS UNDERLYING
THE CONVICTION HAD ALREADY BEEN ADMITTED, AND THE STATE HAD
PRESENTED OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF HER GUILT.
Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion "by allowing the State, in
the course of cross-examination, to elicit and introduce evidence of [defendant's] six- or
seven-year-old drug conviction, wrong, or bad act." Aplt. Br. at 8. It is unnecessary,
however, to review the trial court's ruling, that the prior conviction was admissible for a
legitimate purpose because any error was harmless. But evidence of defendant's drug
possession and arrest which led to that conviction had already been offered into evidence,
11
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without objection. Thus, even if reference to her prior conviction were improperly admitted,
its admission was, at most, harmless error.
A. Admission of underlying facts of 1998 conviction.
Defendant was convicted in 1998 for illegal possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). See R210:218, 302-03, R211:5. During direct examination by the
prosecution, Officer Galbraith testified that defendant mentioned her prior drug use several
times after her arrest. First, when he questioned her about the drugs and paraphernalia found
in her car, she told him that she had not used methamphetamine in six years. R209:104. She
then indicated that her fingerprints would be found on the contraband "from the last time she
used methamphetamine, which she then indicated was seven years ago." R209:106.
Defendant did not obj ect to this testimony. On cross examination, Officer Galbraith testified
that defendant had argued with him when asked to exit her vehicle because "she believed I
had done a background check on her and that I was familiar that she had been arrested on a
prior occasion for drugs." R209:133. Defendant again offered no objection. Her prior drug
use was mentioned several more times on cross examination, each instance drawing no
objection. R209:143, 161-62.
Defendant, on the other hand, denied ever telling Officer Galbraith about the bag, and
testified that she had no recollection of the bag containing the contraband. R210:197,203.
On cross examination, the prosecutor asked defendant whether she had in fact told Officer
Galbraith about her prior conviction, to which she replied that she had not. R210:210.
Defense counsel objected, and stated that although Officer Galbraith had mentioned her prior

12
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drug use, he had never specifically discussed a conviction. R210:210,213. The prosecutor
noted that it was not being introduced for character evidence, but to prove intent, which
defendant had placed at issue by denying knowledge of the bag. R210:211-12. The court
found that the conviction was being offered to prove intent, was relevant to the case, and its
prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh its probative value. R210:214-15. The
court gave the jury an appropriate cautionary instruction, and defendant admitted her
conviction for possessing methamphetamine. R210:217-18.
B. Evidence of defendant's conviction, when the facts of the underlying crime
had already been introduced, was harmless.
Rule 404(b) "is an 'inclusionary' rule." State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 369 (Utah
App. 1996) (citations omitted). "[Ejvidence demonstrating other purposes is not precluded
as long as the evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to show the defendant's
propensity to commit the crime charged." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, f 17, 108 P.3d 730.
When treating a 404(b) objection, the court must consider three elements: "(1) whether such
evidence is being offered for a proper noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) whether such
evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) whether this evidence meets the
requirements of rule 403." State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, \ 20, 993 P.2d 837.
In this case, the Court need not consider whether the court abused its discretion in
admitting evidence of defendant's conviction, because defendant has failed to prove that she

13
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

was harmed by its admission.2 It is well established that "an appellate court will not overturn
a jury verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the admission of the evidence did not
reasonably effect the likelihood of a different verdict." State v. Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118,
f 26,62 P.3d 444. See also State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,240 (Utah 1992) (unnecessary
to consider 404(b) claim where any error was harmless). As discussed above, evidence of
defendant's prior drug use and arrest had been admitted several times without objection. The
mere addition of a conviction "would come as little surprise to the jury, and would do little to
prejudice the jury against [her]." Housekeeper, 2002 UT 118, \ 26. As defendant effectively
concedes, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt. See Aplt. Br. at 16 ("The need for the
evidence as well as the efficacy of alternative proof was extremely low in the instant case.")
Defendant failed several field sobriety tests, admitted her fingerprints would be on the
contraband, refused a drug test, and was in sole possession of the drugs and paraphernalia at
the time of her arrest. Finally, the trial court gave the jury a cautionary instruction, that the
prior conviction could be used only to consider defendant's intent on the day in question to
use or possess a controlled substance. R210:217. SeeStatev. Widdison, 2000 UT App 185,
T[31,4 P.3d 100 (holding that even if 404(b) evidence was improperly admitted, cautionary
instruction rendered any error harmless). In short, any error in admitting defendant's
conviction was harmless.

2

The State does not concede that the trial court committed error. Indeed, the trial
court's careful consideration essentially employed the test outlined in DeCorso, and its
analysis shows that the prior conviction was properly admitted. See R.210: 214-16
14
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II. THE STATE CONCEDES THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
RESOLVE AN ALLEGED INACCURACY IN THE PRESENTENCE
INVESTIGATION REPORT.
When a defendant informs the court of an inaccuracy in their presentence
investigation report, the court has a statutory duty to address and resolve the inaccuracy on
the record. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(6)(a) (West Supp. 2005). The Utah Supreme
Court has interpreted this statute to require sentencing courts to make "an express
determination of the parties' objections to the presentence report on the record." State v.
Jaeger, 1999 UT 1,^45 n.6,973 P.2d404. Failure to do so is error. Id f 45, The Supreme
Court re-affirmed this standard when it held that the trial court had committed error when it
failed to make specific findings on the record, even though "the trial court was clearly aware
of the issues and the alternative characterization urged by defendant." State v. Veteto, 2000
UT62,f-15,6P.3d'-1133.
In this case, defendant disputed the accuracy of the 1983 drug possession conviction
set out in the PSI. R207:34-35; 211 at 5. R207:34-35. However, the court failed to make
any findings or resolve the alleged inaccuracy on the record. This was error. Therefore, this
Court should remand this case to the sentencing court "for the sole purpose of resolving such
objections on the record." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, | 46; see also Veteto, 2000 UT 62, t 16
(remanding "for the limited purpose of resolving Vetetofs objections to the presentence
investigative report on the record"). However, "[t]he sentence imposed by the trial court is
not to be disturbed on remand." Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, \ 46; see also State v. Maroney, 2004
UT App 206,94 P.3d 295 (upholding sentence supported by substantial, reliable information
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against plain error challenge notwithstanding remand for correction of some alleged
inaccuracies in PSI).
III. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED
BY HIS COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ASK THE COURT TO RESOLVE THE
ALLEGED INACCURACY IN THE PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT.
Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient in not
"requesting] that the trial court utilize its fact finding function to resolve the inaccuracy in
the [PSI]." Aplt. Br. at 18-20. He further asserts that but for that "unprofessional error . . .
the result at sentencing would have been different." Aplt. Br. at 20. The claim is meritless.
"To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, [a defendant] must meet both prongs
of the test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984)." State v. Wright, 2004 UT App 102, \ 9, 90
P.3d 644. "To prevail, a defendant must show, first, that his counsel rendered a deficient
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective
standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance
prejudiced the defendant." Id. (citations omitted). "[Because a defendant has the burden of
meeting both parts of the Strickland test, it is unnecessary for this court to apply both parts
where our inquiry reveals that one of its parts is not satisfied." Id. (bracket in original)
(citations omitted). "'When it is "easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground
of lack of sufficient prejudice," we will do so without addressing whether counsel's
performance was professionally reasonable."'" Id. (citing Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516,
523 (Utah 1994), quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069)).
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Here, it is unnecessary to consider whether counsel rendered deficient performance by
not insisting that the trial court immediately resolve the alleged inaccuracy in the PSI
because defendant has failed to establish prejudice. First, defendant's claim of prejudice is
inadequately briefed. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not adequately
briefed.59). See also State v. Gambling, 2000 UT 44, ^ 7,1 P.3d 1108 (noting inadequacy of
appellant's brief which failed to provide "meaningful legal analysis" and "merely continued]
one or two sentences stating his argument generally . . . and then broadly conclude[ed] that
[appellant] is entitled to relief).
Defendant's assertion that he was prejudiced consists of a single sentence: "By [sic]
alerting the trial court of its obligation, the trial court more likely than not would have duly
considered the inaccuracy set forth in the presentence investigation report, which, in turn,
would have allowed it to more fully [sic] the matters presented during sentencing." Aplt. Br.
at 20. The assertion is speculative. See Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 526 (Utah)
(speculation is not sufficient to meet the prejudice component of the ineffective assistance of
counsel test), cert, denied, 513 U.S. 966, 115 S. Ct. 431 (1994). It is also unsupported by
any analysis or citation to the record of the sentencing. Gambling, 2000 UT 44 at \ 7.
Therefore, the Court should decline to consider it.
Even if the trial court failed to resolve the alleged inaccurate 1983 conviction for drug
possession as a result of counsel's alleged negligence, defendant fails to show that its
resolution would have made a difference in the outcome. See State v. Maroney, 2004 UT
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App 206, 94 P.3d 295 (upholding sentence supported by substantial, reliable information
against plain error challenge notwithstanding remand for correction of some alleged
inaccuracies in PSI). That is, even if the 1983 conviction were erased from the record, the
trial court would still have sentenced defendant as it did.
Here, there was ample evidence that defendant was a long-term drug addict in need of
rehabilitation.

Defendant's criminal record included two undisputed convictions for

possession of controlled substances in 1998, for which she was put on probation. R211 at 5.
The PSI investigator reported that defendant admitted first using illicit drugs when she was
fifteen years old, and that she had experimented with cocaine and marijuana. Id. at 2. She
admitted that she had abused methamphetamine, but that she had not used it since 2001, a
claim the investigator doubted. Id. She claimed never to have received substance abuse
treatment and denied that it was necessary. Id. Nevertheless, the investigator recommended
that defendant "[s]erve 180 days with release to an impatient program after 120 days." Id.
Based on this unchallenged information and in accord with AP&P' s recommendation,
the trial court sentenced defendant to only 180 days in jail for convictions of second-degree
felony and class A drug possession and class B paraphernalia possession and DUI. Rl 62-63.
With defendant's welfare in mind, the court repeatedly noted that its order was specifically
designed to make treatment options available to her. The court placed defendant on
probation for three years, directing her release to an inpatient drug rehabilitation program
after serving ninety days in jail if space became available. R163; 207:58-60. At sentencing,
defendant argued only that she should be placed on probation, but without serving any prison
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or jail time as AP&P recommended. R207:35, 47, 57; R211 at 2. On appeal, however,
defendant makes no substantive argument that had the alleged inaccuracy been resolved in
her favor the court would have altered its eminently reasonable sentencing order. In short,
defendant's ineffective assistance claim fails because she has not shown that she was
prejudiced by her counsel's alleged deficient performance.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
defendant's convictions and sentence, but remand the case to the trial court to resolve
defendant's objections to the contents of her presentence report.
Respectfully submitted April 7^1, 2006.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

KENNETH A. BRONSTON
Assistant Attorney General
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